The evolution of utility functions and psychological altruism by Clavien, C. & Chapuisat, M.
lable at ScienceDirect
Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 56 (2016) 24e31Contents lists avaiStudies in History and Philosophy of Biological and
Biomedical Sciences
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/shpscThe evolution of utility functions and psychological altruism
Christine Clavien*, Michel Chapuisat
Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Lausanne, Unil-Sorge, Biophore, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerlanda r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:







Model of social evolution* Corresponding author. Present address: iEH2, Ce
rue Michel Servet, 1211 Genève 4, Switzerland.
E-mail address: christine.clavien@unige.ch (C. Clav
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.10.008
1369-8486/ 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.a b s t r a c t
Numerous studies show that humans tend to be more cooperative than expected given the assumption
that they are rational maximizers of personal gain. As a result, theoreticians have proposed elaborated
formal representations of human decision-making, in which utility functions including “altruistic” or
“moral” preferences replace the purely self-oriented “Homo economicus” function. Here we review
mathematical approaches that provide insights into the mathematical stability of alternative utility
functions. Candidate utility functions may be evaluated with help of game theory, classical modeling of
social evolution that focuses on behavioral strategies, and modeling of social evolution that focuses
directly on utility functions. We present the advantages of the latter form of investigation and discuss
one surprisingly precise result: “Homo economicus” as well as “altruistic” utility functions are less stable
than a function containing a preference for the common welfare that is only expressed in social contexts
composed of individuals with similar preferences. We discuss the contribution of mathematical models
to our understanding of human other-oriented behavior, with a focus on the classical debate over psy-
chological altruism. We conclude that human can be psychologically altruistic, but that psychological
altruism evolved because it was generally expressed towards individuals that contributed to the actor’s
ﬁtness, such as own children, romantic partners and long term reciprocators.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences1. Introduction
Neo-classical economics is often criticized for formalizing
human decision-making as a purely self-oriented process, ac-
cording to which humans act only upon preferences for their
own welfare maximizationdhumans may choose actions that
beneﬁt others or the public welfare, but only when these actions
also beneﬁt them. Yet, there is room within the neo-classical
theoretical framework for alternative and more other-oriented
descriptions of human motivation. Which formal account of
decision-making is the most ﬁtting description or the best pre-
dictive tool will depend very much on the area of human activity
that is investigatedde.g. stock market dynamic interactions,ntre Médical Universitaire, 1
ien).consumereproducer interactions, private social interactions
(Kirchgässner, 2008).
An important difﬁculty faced by theoreticians is to ﬁnd a reliable
method for assessing alternatives formalizations of decision-
making, and decide which one is the most ﬁtting for the area of
human activity that is investigated. Here we discuss the formal-
ization of private social interactions with utility functions, we
investigate various ways to assess the mathematical stability of
these utility functions, and we discuss the impact of this area of
research for understanding human other-oriented psychological
mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some
introductory notions of neo-classical economic theory and an
overview of the sort of utility functions that can be elaborated to
represent private social interactions. We then describe the main
features of game theory (Section 3), classic models of social evo-
lution (Section 4), and models of social evolution that take utility
functions as evolving traits (Section 5). Along the way, we present
important results obtained with these methods and explain why
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assess utility functions. In Section 5 we also present a fascinating
result: Ingela Alger and Jörgen Weibull (2013) have found that
“Homo economicus”di.e. the purely self-oriented utility func-
tiondand all the “altruistic” functionsdi.e. those that contain a
preference for social partners welfaredare evolutionary unstable
in the presence of a utility function containing a preference for the
common welfare that is conditionally expressed in social contexts
where other individuals have similar preferences. In Section 6 we
provide psychological interpretations of utility functions and
investigate the extent to which mathematical models inform us
about human other-regarding and altruistic motivation. This
investigation reveals the conditions under which humans are likely
to care for collaborative interactions and to evolve psychological
altruism.
2. A taxonomy of utility functions
An important goal in neo-classical economics is to ﬁnd the best
way to formalize human’s choices of action. The aim is to under-
stand and predict individual behavior in socio-economic contexts,
such as situations of conﬂicting interests. Neo-classical economics
assumes that, whenever humans have the choice between alter-
native actionsde.g. investing or not, collaborating or not, helping
or note, they choose to maximize their personal utility
(Kirchgässner, 2008). Individual utility can be described mathe-
matically as a function of hierarchically ranked preferences for
objects of choicede.g. goods, states of the world. Utility functions
can take an inﬁnite variety of forms (see Fig. 1) but their relevance
depends on whether they capture real features of human decision-
making in the particular area of activity that is investigated. Let us
consider some utility function that may characterize private social
interactions.
The simplest function, usually labeled “Homo economicus”, re-
duces human preferences to individuals’ own welfaredor
payoffdmaximization, where welfare is deﬁned as an objective
and measurable currency such as material or economic proﬁt, or
number of offspring. Mathematically, for a two person interaction,
it can be formalized with the following equation (Weibull, 1995):








where mi(xi,xj) describes the actor’s utility, that is, how much she
valuesdgives weight todthe outcome of the interaction (xi,xj)Fig. 1. Examples of utility functions families.where the actor plays xi and her social partner plays xj, and ui(xi,xj)
is the actor’s objective welfare if interaction (xi,xj) is performed. The
formula can be simpliﬁed to: mi ¼ ui.
“Homo economicus” is a purely self-oriented utility function
because it induces individuals to ignore other individuals’ welfare,
as well as the common good. Other utility functions combine self-
directed and social or other-oriented preferences. Gary Becker
(1976) for example deﬁnes a utility function for an actor who
cares as much about her social partner’s welfare as about her own
welfare. We refer to this as:
“Egalitarian altruism” mEA; i ¼ ui þ uj
where mi describes the actor’s utility, ui the actor’s welfare, and uj
the welfare for the social partner.
This model fails to capture the fact that humans usually care
more for their own welfare than for others’ welfare. To account for
this phenomenon, several theoreticians have proposed a family of
utility functions that integrate the sum of the actor’s welfare and
the welfare of the social partner weighted by an altruistic factor
(e.g. Mayr, Harbaugh, & Tankersley, 2009). We label this speciﬁc
form of altruism:
“Degree altruism” mDA; i ¼ ui þ auj
where a (e1  a  1) describes how much the actor cares for the
welfare of her social partner. When a ¼ 0, she cares only for her
ownwelfare; when a ¼ 1, she values her partner’s welfare as much
as her own. This formula captures the idea that some individuals in
a population may be more altruistic than others. It can also
represent spiteful preferences, since negative values of amean that
the actor is motivated to reduce the other’s welfare. Note that
“Homo economicus” and “Egalitarian altruism” are special cases of
“Degree altruism”, where a ¼ 0 and 1 respectively.
An alternative utility function has been proposed by Akçay, Van
Cleve, Feldman, & Roughgarden (2009). They represent how much
an individual ‘likes’ a given outcome as the product of her own
payoff and her partner’s payoff weighted by an altruistic factor. We
refer to this as:
“Conditional degree altruism” mCDA;i ¼ uiuaj
Here, a also describes how much the actor cares for the welfare
of her social partner but its weight depends on the welfare state of
the actor. This model captures the fact that humans may be less
likely to care for others when they are in a state of needdand
reversely.
Another interesting family of utility functions has been devel-
oped by David Levine (1998). Here, the actor maximizes the addi-
tion of her personal welfare, and her social partners’ welfare
weighted by two factors: the extent to which the actor cares for her
social partner (altruistic factor) and the extent to which her social
partner cares for others (reciprocal factor). More precisely, the actor
cares more for the welfare of social partners that are believed to be
more altruistic. Levine deﬁnes this family of function as:
“Reciprocal altruism” mRA; i ¼ ui þ
ai þ laj
1þ l uj
where a represents the individual’s coefﬁcient of altruism (or
spitefulness) and l (0  l  1) represents how much the actor is
sensitive to her partner’s coefﬁcients of altruism: l ¼ 0 means that
she is not inﬂuenced by the other’s character (in this case, “Recip-
rocal altruism” boils down to “Degree altruism”), and positive values
imply that she cares for her partner welfare proportionally to the
partner coefﬁcient of altruism.
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other players’ utility, but also that their attitudes toward other
players depend on how they feel they are being treated” (Levine,
1998). Indeed, the equation implies that the actor is less altruistic
towards less altruistic partners.
Our last example refers to Erst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt (1999).
Their family of utility functions, labeled “Inequity aversion”, cap-
tures the fact that “people resist inequitable outcomes; i.e., they are
willing to give up some material payoff to move in the direction of
more equitable outcomes.” Thus, the actor’s utility is maximized if
inequity is minimized:








where gi max(ujui,0) represents the utility loss from inequalities
disadvantageous for the actor (this term becomes positive when
gi > 0 and uj > ui), and bi max(ui  uj,0) represents the utility loss
from inequalities advantageous for the actor (this term becomes
positive when bi > 0 and ui > uj). Note that whenever gi and bi > 0,
the actor’s utility mi, is maximized when the welfare state of her
partner equals her own welfare state, thus when uj ¼ ui.
The sheer number of utility functions raises the difﬁculty of
deciding which onesdif anydare accurate descriptions of human
private social interactions. For this task, various assessment
methods are available (see Fig. 2) such as: i) appraising the extent to
which utility functions generate non-trivial predictions that can be
tested in controlled experiments (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Guala,
2005; Smith, 1962); ii) investigating the empirical validity of utility
functions with ﬁeld observations and qualitative data (Emirbayer &
Mische, 1998); iii) examining utility functions’ theoretical coher-
ence with help of reasoning and logical argumentation (Kincaid &
Ross, 2009; Nozick, 1969); iv) assessing utility function’s mathe-
matical stability. This can be donewith game theory (Axelrod,1984;
Binmore, 2005), to investigate the extent to which a utility function
leads to equilibrium situationsde.g. a Nash equilibrium, a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, an evolutionary stable equilibriumdin various
strategic games or situations. Alternatively, information about
evolutionary stability can be inferred from models of social evolu-
tion (Güth & Yaari,1992). All thesemethods are relevant procedures
for evaluating utility functions. Here, we present and discuss the

















models of social 
evolution
target of selection: 
behavioral strategies
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the various ways to assess the value of utility functions. See
accompanying text for details.3. Game theory
Game theory is the study of strategic interactions among social
partners (Nash, 1950; Schelling, 1960). It provides mathematical
tools for assessing if behavioral strategies reach stable equilibria.
Games are composed of general interaction rulesde.g. players
interact pairwise, they can play cooperation or defection e, a set of
behavioral strategies which are instructions about which action to
take in each possible situation in the gamede.g. ‘Always play def-
ection’, ‘Choose randomly’, ‘Defect if your partner has a
cooperation-reputation below x and cooperate otherwise’ e, and
an outcome matrix which deﬁnes the payoff of players for each
possible interaction. Scholars search for behavioral equilibria in
these games, such as the Nash solution that arises when each
strategy is a “best reply” to the other strategy; this means that given
her partner’s choice of action, none of the players would have
earned more in choosing an alternative action. These equilibria are
considered as indices for stability and efﬁciency in real situations
(Binmore, 2005).
In the subﬁeld of evolutionary game theory, payoff is a surrogate
for ﬁtness and strategic interactions are modeled as collections of
repeated gamesde.g. series of pairwise interactions between
randomlymatched individualse, where strategies “reproduce” and
transmit clones of themselves to the next series of repeated games.
In these models, the desired equilibrium is the evolutionary stable
situation where one strategydor a well-deﬁned mixture of strat-
egiesdcannot be invaded by another strategy.
Game theory may be used as an indirect way to test the
evolutionary stability of utility functions because there is a causal
link between behavioral strategies and utility functions. Let us
specify this causal link before examining how game theory can be
used for assessing utility functions.
Behavioral strategies are immutable action rules for speciﬁc so-
cial contexts that humans may encounter during their life. Utility
functions provide general instructions for deciding which behav-
ioral strategies to use in a range of social contexts. These general
instructions may include some level of preference for own welfar-
eduidsome level of preference for the social partner’s welfar-
edauj e, some level of aversion against inequitable outcomesdgi
and bi e, etc. A utility function can generate different behavioral
strategies in different social settings. For instance, in a two players
iterated prisoner’s dilemma1 situation with no knowledge about
social partners’ behavioral propensities, the “Homo economicus”
utility function induces the strategy “always defect”. In contrast,
when more information is providedde.g. knowledge about social
partners’ past behavior e, “Homo economicus” induces cooperative
behavior towards partners that are likely to cooperate with co-
operators and to punish non cooperatorsdassuming that the cost
for being punished is higher than the beneﬁt from defecting. As
second example, “Reciprocal altruism” with positive a and l values
leads to an other-oriented strategy when the actor believes that she
interacts with an ‘altruistic’ partner, and to a self-interested strat-
egy otherwise. This rule holds independently of whether the social
partner has cooperated or defected in the preceding interaction.
From this example, it should be clear that “Reciprocal altruism” as
utility function should not be confused with Reciprocal altruism as
behavioral strategydi.e. Tit For Tat.1 A prisoner’s dilemma is a two player game. Each player decides either to
cooperate or to defect without knowing the other player’s choice. The payoff matrix
of the game is such that mutual cooperation provides better beneﬁt than mutual
defection, while unilateral defection provides the largest beneﬁt. In such a situation,
both players have an incentive to defect, although they would be better off if they
both decided to cooperate.
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behavioral strategies that are overall advantageous for their bearers
will be selected, and vice versa. Awell-known result in evolutionary
game theory (Axelrod, 1984; Binmore, 2005) is that discriminative
cooperation with other cooperators but not with defectors usually
reaches equilibrium in iterated prisoner’s dilemma situations. Thus,
one may expect that stable utility functions induce such discrimi-
native cooperation. Reversely, utility functions that fail to do so are
likely to be unstable. This is for instance the case of “Egalitarian
altruism” because it always induces its bearers to choose a cooper-
ative strategy that promotes both partners’ payoff irrespective of
whether the partner is a cooperator or a defector.
This way of assessing utility functions is limited for two reasons.
First, different utility functions may give rise to the same behavior
in a speciﬁc social context. For instance if individuals cannot obtain
information about their partners’ utility functions, “Degree
altruism” and “Reciprocal altruism” induce the same behavioral
strategies. As second example, the various altruistic utility func-
tions with a positive but not too large a value usually induce
cooperative behaviordthe a factor leads the actor to do sodexcept
when own welfare is threatened too muchdthe ui factor leads the
actor to avoid being fully exploited. Therefore, whenever two utility
functions generate similar outcomes in a given game, they cannot
be differentiated. Second, since utility functions can generate
different behavioral strategies in different social contexts, their
evolutionary stability should be assessed across social contexts.
Indeed, evolution is always a trade-off between different ﬁtness
costs and beneﬁts obtained in the course of organisms’ life (Nettle,
2006). If a utility function is successful in most ﬁtness-relevant
contextsdi.e. it generates a behavior that is generally advanta-
geous across contexts e, evolution is likely to select it. In light of
this knowledge, results obtained with models that contain speciﬁc
assumptions over social interactionsde.g. prisoner’s dilemma sit-
uations with random assortment between individuals andmemory
of past interactionsdand take into account a limited number of
competing strategies cannot easily be generalized.4. Models of social evolution Idfocus on behavioral
strategies
Population genetics provides the foundation for models of social
evolution (Frank,1998). Thesemodels have helped understanding a
vast number of animal and human behavior such as cooperative
interactions, parental investment, or mate choice (Cavalli-Sforza &
Feldman, 1981; Davies, Krebs, & West, 2012; MacElreath & Boyd,
2007). They compare the evolutionary success of competing type-
sdi.e. behavioral rules endowed by individualsdin well-deﬁned
environmental settings. A population, composed of same-types
resident individuals, faces the invasion of a mutant. If the mutant
has a ﬁtness advantage over the residents, it invades the
population.
Models of social evolution that focus on behavioral strategies
may also be used as assessment tools for evaluating the stability of
utility functions. For instance, one group selection model devel-
oped by Gintis (2000) provides evidence for the evolutionary sta-
bility of a behavioral strategy called Strong reciprocity.2 The setting
is a repeated public good situation3 where individuals interact in2 In the literature, Strong reciprocity may take various signiﬁcations (Clavien &
Chapuisat, 2013) but in the present context, it refers to a behavioral strategy by
which the actors “increase the ﬁtness of unrelated individuals at a cost to them-
selves.” (Gintis, 2000, p. 173).
3 A public good game is a prisoner’s dilemma game (see footnote 1) which counts
more than two players.groups that emerge, last for a period of time, and dissolve in a cyclic
way. Two strategies compete against each other: Strong reciprocity
that always induces its bearers to contribute to the public good, and
punish non-contributors at some personal cost; and the Self-inter-
est strategy which induces no costly punishment of non-
contributors and cooperation only when individually advanta-
geous. Gintis found that Strong reciprocity cannot drive Self-interest
to extinction, but stabilizes at some fraction in the population un-
der a large range of parameter values of his model. This result is
about behavioral strategies rather than utility functions. However,
it indicates that a pure Homo economicus view of human prefer-
ences is not satisfactory because in the social environment
formalized in Gintis’ model, “Homo economicus” would never
induce the Strong reciprocity evolutionary stable strategy. Some
authors have suggested instead that the Strong reciprocity strategy
is induced by an “Inequity aversion” preference (Fehr & Gintis,
2007).
This way of assessing utility functions is limited for the same
reasons mentioned in the previous section. As for game theory,
these models of social evolution focus on behavioral strategies and
reﬂect speciﬁc social interactions. For instance, Gintis’ model in-
cludes non-trivial constraints, such as a public good situation, only
two strategies available, and a complex cycle of group formation
and dissolution. These speciﬁcities make it difﬁcult to generalize
the model’s results to other social environments and to make
strong claims for or against particular utility functions.
5. Models of social evolution IIdfocus on utility functions
In order to overcome the limitations of traditional evolutionary
methods, some theoreticians have developed new models of social
evolution to test the evolutionary stability of utility functions.4
These models consider utility functions instead of behavioral stra-
tegies as evolving traits of interest (Akçay et al., 2009; Alger &
Weibull, 2012, 2013; Grund, Waloszek, & Helbing, 2013; Güth &
Yaari, 1992; Huck & Oechssler, 1999). They rely on the assumption
that utility functions represent genetically or culturally inherited
psychological mechanisms shaped by selection.5 Utility functions
deﬁne what individuals value, thus provide general instructions for
deciding which behavioral strategies to use in different social
contexts. Utility functions thus guide individual behavior and are
selected on the basis of the welfare payoff obtained by the social
partners during their interactions, across social contexts and over
their lifetime. A utility function promoting behavioral strategies
that are overall advantageous for its bearers will be selected.
More precisely, in models of social evolution focusing on utility
functions, the social partners inherit a utility function which they
cannot modify during their life. Across social contexts, they always
choose the behavioral strategies that lead them to maximize their
utility function. Since a utility function can prescribe different
behavioral strategies in different social settings, partners may
change their behavioral strategies and adjust them to their
knowledge of the relevant features of the social context, such as
which game they are playing or which type of social partner they
are interacting with. In models of social evolution, this behavioral
plasticity is formalized in the following way. When social partners4 In the literature, terminology such as “models of preference evolution”, or
“indirect evolutionary approach” refer to these models for the selection of utility
functions.
5 Models of social evolution do not specify how these traits are inherited from
one generation to the next. In theory, inheritance can be genetic or cultural
(memetic transmission). However the cultural interpretation is less realistic
because transmission of cultural traits entails a high error rate which hinders the
selection process.
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the equilibrium situationde.g. a Nash equilibrium or a Bayesian
Nash equilibriumdfromwhich they are not likely to deviate if they
repeatedly encounter the same situation. They thus always “ratio-
nally“ choose the best strategy given their utility function and the
features of the social situation. The underlying conjecture is that in
the real world, behavioral dynamics operates quickly and in-
dividuals are usually fast at ﬁnding an equilibrium and behave
accordingly during long series of social interactions.
This procedure can be represented with a model of social evo-
lution for two players interactions. A resident population composed
of individuals of one type q competes against mutants of an alter-
native type s. q and s represent utility functions such as “Homo
economicus”, “Degree altruism” or “Inequity aversion”. When two
individuals encounter each other, they play a Nash equilibrium, that
is, they both choose the behavior that is the best reply to their
partner’s choice of action, given their own type and their knowl-
edge of the situation. Each pair of choice results in individual ﬁtness
deﬁned by the payoff matrix of the game.
After each round of pairwise interactions, utility functions’
payoffs can be calculated and compared. This calculus takes into
account the payoffdi.e. ﬁtnessdreceived by individuals in the
three possible interactionsdi.e. when q meets q, when q meets s,
and when s meets sdand the probabilities of occurrence of these
three forms of interactions. These probabilities usually depend on
the proportion of q and s individuals in the population, but they can
also be inﬂuenced by other factors such as a biased probability to
meet partners of one’s own type. For a utility function to be
evolutionary stable, it needs to withstand the invasion of all alter-
native mutant types, by providing a better ﬁtness payoff to its
bearers in all Nash equilibria, and by being the best response to
itself.6 This procedure allows for testing the evolutionary stability
of any utility function, q, against any alternative utility function, s,
in any kind of two players strategic interactiondprisoner’s
dilemma, hawk-dove game, etc.
In an important paper, Alger and Weibull (2013) analyzed the
evolutionary stability of utility functions in two players in-
teractions in an inﬁnite population. One particular feature of
their model is the matching process between individuals: it in-
cludes an index of assortativity which deﬁnes how likely in-
dividuals with a given utility function are matched with
individuals sharing the same function. Thus, the probability that
an individual with utility function q meets an individual with
utility function s depend on the proportion of individuals with
utility functions q and s in the population and on the index of
assortativity. Another feature of the model is that individuals
have limited knowledge about their social partners’ utility func-
tions: utility functions are not directly observable, but individuals
know the index of assortativity, thus have statistical information
about their social partner type. When two individuals encounter
each other, they play a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, that is, they
both choose the behavior that is the best reply to their partner’s
choice of action, given their own type and their limited knowl-
edge of the situation.7 In their study, Alger & Weibull showed the
importance of one new family of utility functions, which they
label “Homo moralis”.6 There is one technical difﬁculty linked to the fact that two or more utility
functions may output the same evolutionary stable behavioral strategy in a given
social situation, leaving room for drift to select between them. This difﬁculty can be
addressed with a complementary test for instabilitydhow competing utility
functions resist to invasion (see Alger & Weibull for details).
7 In case of multiple possible equilibria, the analysis takes into account the results
of the interactions in all equilibria.“Homo moralis” mHM; i

xi; xj




This function partitions the actor’s utility in two separate terms
whose respectiveweight depends on the k (0 k 1) value:ui(xi,xj)
represents the payoff obtained by the actor, i, assuming that her
interaction partner is of a different type, j, and ui(xi,xi) represents
the payoff obtained by the actor, i, assuming that her interaction
partner is of her own type. Note that this partition in two compo-
nents only makes sense in social situations where the actors have
an imperfect knowledge about their partners’ utility functionsd-
this is an important feature of Alger & Weibull’s model. Moreover,
since individuals behave according to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
at evolutionary equilibriumdi.e. when one utility function has
invaded the populationdthey maximize their own welfare in the
ﬁrst term of the equation, and contribute to the commonwelfare in
the second term of the equation. This explains why Alger &Weibull
label k the “degree of morality”. One may describe it as a degree of
interest for the commonwelfare although the authors describe it as
a motivation to follow the Kantian imperative (see below for
details).
Interestingly, Alger andWeibull do not emphasize an alternative
interpretation of k. We think that this factor also captures the ac-
tor’s propensity to choose the action that would produce the best
outcome for herself if everybodydincluding herselfdwould behave
the same. Indeed, the second part of the equation contains the
assumption that mj ¼ mi, and uj ¼ ui. Thus, k may also be summa-
rized as the actor’s belief that her social partner adopts the same
behavior. Under this reading, high values of k indicate that the actor
believes there is high probability of interactingwith a partner of her
type.
The “Homo moralis” family of functions varies on a single
dimension, k. At one extreme, if k ¼ 0, it becomes:







At the other extreme, if k ¼ 1, the actor always choses the action
that maximizes the commonwelfare assuming that her interaction
partner behaves the same. Alger & Weibull link this utility function
to a Kantian form of behavior because the actor’s choice reﬂects the
famous principle: “act only according to that maxim whereby you
can at the same time will that it should become a universal law
without contradiction.” They consequently label the following
utility function:
“Homo kantiansis” mHK; i

xi; xj
 ¼ uiðxi; xiÞ
After exploring the evolutionary stability of a number of func-
tionsdincluding “Egalitarian altruism”, “Degree altruism”, “Recip-
rocal altruism” and “Inequity aversion”din social contexts with
different payoff matrixes and degrees of assortativity, Alger &
Weibull found that evolution selects “Homo moralis” whenever k
equals the index of assortativity of thematching process. This result
leads to the most stable utility function, which the authors label:
“Homo hamiltoniensis” mHH; i

xi;xj




Where r is the index of assortativity between two playersdi.e. the
probability that the actor encounters a social partner of her type.8
“Homo hamiltoniensis” drives to extinction competing utility
functions in most social contextsdform of game, index of assor-
tativitydand cannot be invaded by an alternative utility function8 Note that r is calculated in the same way for “Homo hamiltoniensis” as for
Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton, 1964, 1970).
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“Homo hamiltoniensis”. Conversely, Alger & Weibull show analyti-
cally that all utility functions that induce other behaviors than
those generated by “Homo hamiltoniensis” are evolutionary
unstable.
It follows that “Homo economicus” is evolutionary stable only in
social contexts characterized by fully random matching, which
means zero assortativity between individuals of the same type.
Selection of “Homo kantiansis”, on the other hand requires full
assortativity. This result is particularly interesting in light of the
factdwell-documented in the social sciencesdthat humans rarely
encounter these extreme situations of zero or full assortativity.
Many factors, including social class, family bounds, or working
environments, raise the probability of interactions between similar
individuals, but meeting with “outsiders” is not rare either.
To sum up, a general conclusion from Alger &Weibull’s model is
that it is advantageous to have a preference for the commonwelfare
(k > 0), but only to the extent that we interact with individuals of
the same type. Thus, “Homo hamiltoniensis” could also be described
as “Homo parochialis” or “Homo homophilus”. An alter-
nativedequally acceptabledinterpretation is that it is advanta-
geous to have some preference for personal welfare when we are
capable of assessing the probability of interacting with individuals
of our own type. In light of the latter interpretation, it may seem
odd to use the moralistic terminology for describing k.
Models of social evolution that focus directly on utility functions
are particularly informative because they provide general results
which help to interpret speciﬁc outcomes of models that focus on
behavioral strategies. For instance, Alger and Weibull’s analysis
solves the tension between individual and collective interest by
making benevolent strategic behavior proportional to the proba-
bility of interacting with benevolent partners. This general result
explains why Gintis (2000) found that the behavioral strategy
Strong reciprocity can be stabilized: it is because individuals interact
in small groups during a successive number of time periods, which
is one waydamong othersdto introduce assortativity in a system.
It should be easy to show that “Homo hamiltoniensis” would induce
Strong reciprocity in the particular setting described by Gintis.
6. Impact on our understanding of human other-oriented
psychology
Let us assume that knowledge about the stabilitydor insta-
bilitydof utility functions in mathematical models conveys rele-
vant general messages about human social decision-making: that
is, humans have evolved decision mechanisms that tend to maxi-
mize stable utility functions. Under this assumption, it makes sense
to investigate what psychological mechanisms could underlie the
preferences contained in utility functions (Section 6.1). Such
investigation provides information about which psychological
mechanisms maydor may notdhave evolved for regulating hu-
man social interactions. This investigation will also lead us to argue
that psychological altruism evolved towards individuals that
generally contributed to the actor’s individual ﬁtness (Section 6.2).
6.1. Psychological interpretation of utility functions
Utility functions represent general and stable patterns of in-
dividuals’ decisions-making. Moreover, when used in models of
social evolution, utility functions also correspond to bundles of
heritable traits subject to natural selection. Applied to humans,
utility functions thereby represent observable expressionsdi.e.
phenotypesdof inherited psychological mechanisms that guide
everyday social choices. The particular features of the proximate
psychological mechanisms underlying utility functions remainunclear. To illustrate this point, let us consider how “Homo hamil-
toniensis” may operate in the real world.
One important feature of this utility function is ui(xi,xj), a pref-
erence for own welfare. Welfare is deﬁned as an objective and
measurable currency. In evolutionary models, this currency corre-
lates with individual ﬁtnessdi.e. number of offspring. Adapted to
human everyday interactions, objective welfare would correspond
to various states of the world that correlate with an increase in
individual ﬁtness: gathering economic goods, having a romantic
partner, healthy children or long term collaborative relationships
would count among these states of the world. Therefore ui(xi,xj)
may be generated by a web of psychological mechanisms that
induce individuals to seek these various states of the world: for
example, an attraction towards economic goods, or a capacity to
experience love and caring feelings towards romantic partners or
towards one’s own children.
Another important feature of “Homo hamiltoniensis”, ui(xi,xi), is a
preference for the common welfare assuming that the interaction
partners share one’s own typedi.e. assuming that they are simi-
larlymotivated to follow one’s own social rules. Theweight given to
ui(xi,xi) depends on the magnitude of r, the index of assortativity
between partners. Here, various interpretations are possible and
Alger & Weibull’s model does not help to discriminate between
them.
One line of interpretation would be that humans have devel-
oped particular skills for assessing r, the general probability of
interacting with individuals having similar social preferences. For
this, humans may be particularly receptive to some observable
features of their social environments, such as which rules are
supported and followed by the surrounding citizens, and whether
they match with one’s own rules. In addition, humans may have
developed the tendency to adjust the strength of their preferences
ui(xi,xj) and ui(xi,xi) to their estimation of r. In particular, the
proximate mechanisms underlying ui(xi,xi) would be selectively
elicited when the actors believe that they interact with individuals
of their own type. Such a context-sensitive behavioral choice may
be performed in different ways. It could be caused by a rational
calculus: human beings understand that they can increase their
own welfare by contributing to the common good when r is high.
Alternatively, contribution to common welfare may be caused by
non-reﬂexive homophilous mechanisms, including a tendency to
trust individuals that share our own social norms, a drive to engage
in collective projects with these individuals, or a genuine desire to
contribute to the common good or to follow the golden rule-
dwhich is a proxy for the Kantian imperativedwhen interacting
with these individuals. Note that these other-oriented mechanisms
are homophilous in the sense that their magnitude is proportional
to some rough assessment of the probability of interacting with
individuals having similar preferences.
Another line of interpretation is that r plays a major role during
human ontogenesis but not so much at the adult stage. During
ontogenesis, individuals develop psychological character-traits that
will inﬂuence their decisions during their whole life. In social en-
vironments predominantly composed of individuals sharing a ho-
mogenous cooperative preference, growing infants may develop
character-traits that induce them to engage in collective projects,
to act in favor of the common welfare, or to follow the golden rule.
Once developed, these character-traits are not context-sensitive,
but they will tend to be directed towards individuals sharing the
same preferences if migration among social groups is restricted.
It is often difﬁcult to discriminate between alternative potential
proximate mechanisms that may generate the same preference. In
some cases however, it may be possible to identify the underlying
psychological mechanism. For instance, the utility function “Degree
altruism” with a > 0 involves a restriction of ui(xi,xi), the actor’s
C. Clavien, M. Chapuisat / Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 56 (2016) 24e3130preference for her objective welfare in favor of uj(xi,xi), the pref-
erence for the partner’s welfare. Few psychological mechanisms are
likely to produce this pattern of behavior in the whole range of
possible social interactions; non-discriminative empathic feelings
towards social partners or genuine desire to help others are most
likely involved.6.2. Impact on the debate over psychological altruism
Philosophers and psychologists have long debated over humans’
capacity to produce altruistic actions (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Butler,
1991; Hutcheson, 2004). The most important condition for psy-
chologicaldas opposed to biological9daltruism is a genuine
concern for others as necessary cause for the action.10 Whether
psychological altruism exists, depends on the profound motive-
sdi.e. desires, emotionsdunderlying humans’ actions. It is a
question about human psychological mechanisms. The mecha-
nisms that most likely generate altruistic actions are genuine de-
sires or drives to help (Sober & Wilson, 1998), but also basic loving,
caring, or empathic feelings (Clavien, 2012; Kitcher, 2011).
Mathematical models designed for testing the stability of utility
functions are relevant for investigating the scope of psychological
altruism because utility functions inform us about what psycho-
logical mechanisms maydor may notdhave evolved for regulating
human social interactions. One important mathematical result is
that some level of preference for own welfare is needed for the
stability of a utility function. Indeed utility functions lacking this
ui(xi,xj) component induce purely cooperative strategies that are
easily exploited by less cooperative strategies. This is why “Homo
hamiltoniensis”, the most stable utility function reviewed in this
paper, includes a preference for own welfare.
In evolutionary models, objective welfare includes states of the
world such as having a romantic partner, or healthy children.
Therefore, one might expect humans to have developed speciﬁc
loving, caring and empathic feelings towards romantic partners
and own childrendor towards any individual that reliably con-
tributes to the agent’s welfare. The evolutionary reason is that the
welfare of their children or romantic partners is crucial for the
actors’ ownwelfaredi.e. ﬁtness. At the proximate level, actors need
not be aware of it11 and need not calculate the effect of their helping
and caring behavior on their own objective welfare. Sober and
Wilson (1998, chap 10) make this point very clear with the
example of parental care. Self-directed calculus seems to be a less
reliable system than an unmediated drive to help one’s own chil-
dren. Since the latter mechanism is more reliable it is more likely to
have been selected in the course of evolution.
Another mathematical result of Alger & Weibull’s model is that
“Homo hamiltoniensis” outcompetes all alternative utility functions,
including “Homo economicus”, “Inequity aversion” and all those
containing an “altruistic” factor. This result suggests that humans
may have genuine concerns for the common good, or for the golden
rule, or drives to engage in collective projects. However, these
concerns likely evolved in conditions where the actors were
amongst other “Homo hamiltoniensis” individuals. These concerns
may also be homophilous and have coevolved with the capacity to
roughly detect the probability to interact with individuals having
similar preferences. Note that concerns for the golden rule, the9 For more on the distinction between psychological and biological altruism, see
(Clavien & Chapuisat, 2012; Sober & Wilson, 1998).
10 Although self-directed motivesdincluding quest for pleasure, power, honor, or
avoidance of paindmay coexist with the altruistic motive, the latter is a necessary
condition for an altruistic action to come about.
11 They do not even need to be aware of what counts as their objective welfare.common good, or drives to engage in collective projects do not
count as psychologically altruistic because they are not directed
towards particular individuals.
To conclude, the evolutionary stability of the “Homo hamil-
toniensis” utility function suggests that psychological altruism
probably evolved because it contributed to the actor’s own ﬁtness.
It was originally triggered mainly towards individuals increasing
the ﬁtness of the actor. Hence, own children, romantic partners and
long-term social partners were the most likely beneﬁciary of
altruistic actions. This would explain why the most convincing
cases for psychological altruism are to be found in situations such
as parental care (Sober & Wilson, 1998), life in kin groups (Kitcher,
2011), and long term reciprocal exchanges (Trivers, 1971). This does
not exclude however that humans have recently extended the
domain of their altruism towards a broader range of individuals
(Kitcher, 2011), as is the case for many other psychological mech-
anisms (Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004).Acknowledgments
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